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In the Suprema Court of the State of Utah 
GENEVE GRAEHL BURT, LOR-
ELE BURT NEFF, KARL-EEN 
BURT, BONNIE A. BURT, 
SIL-L.~XA G. BURT, JOl-IN G. 
BURT. 
Pl-aintiff's and Respondents. 
vs. 
LUELLA H. BURT, Administra-
trix of the estate of John A. 
Burt, deceased; LUE.LLA H. 
BURT, an individual; EMER-
SON H. BURT, MRS. HELEN 
B. REED, MRS. DOROTHY B. 
FLOWERS, LESTER. C. BURT, 
MILTON F. BURT, 
Defendants and Appell(JJnts. 
No. 7313 
BRIEF OF APPELLAXTS 
STATE~IENT 
This action was filed by Geneve Graehl Burt, a 
plural wife of John A. Burt, deceased, and her five 
children as plaintiffis. The defendants are Luella H. 
Burt, Administratrix of the estate of said John A. Burt, 
deceased, Luella H. Burt as individual and her five chil-
dren. Luella H. Burt is the widow and the legal and law-
ful wife of said deceased. The action is to set aside a 
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deed and for a part of the estate of John A. Burt, 
deceased. 
The original CO~MPL·AINT consists of two causes 
of aetion. About the time of the trial a third caus.e of ac-
tion was filed but before the trial was over this was 
abandoned. This left the first and second causes of 
action ( Tr. 1 to 5) which as .stated in the original com-
plaint except for the verification are as follows: 
''FIRST CAUSE 0 1F AC·TION 
1. That the plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, 
is the: o"\vner in fee of a valuable piece of ground 
in Salt Lake County, ~State of Utah, consisting 
o:f approximately 2.55 acres and described as 
follows: 
Commencing 1223.7 feet East from North-
west Corner of Section 34, Township 1 South 
R 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 315 
feet more or le,ss to Salt Lake City Tract; 
thence South 99 feet; thence South 14° 26' 30'' 
East 154.38 feet, thence West 44.3 feet 8outh 
128.8 feet to creek; Westerly along the creek 
to a point due South of beginning North 332 
feet to beginning. 2.55 Acres. 
2. That said plaintiff came into ownership 
and possession of said traet of land on about the 
15th day of August, 1939, and .since that time 
has with her own hands and labor improved the 
said land by planting fruit tre.e:s and gardens 
thereon, and by removing stumps, dilapidated 
buildings and by landscaping said ground and im-
proving other buildings thereon and by building 
new structures and permitting the building of 
other structures thereon which has greatly en-
hanced and improved the value of said property. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
3. That on the 30th day of SeptembPr, lD~O, 
plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, entt•red into what 
she thought \Vas a. valid and legal marriage with 
one John A. Burt, and since that time through 
their relationship entered into a.s aforesaid, has 
·given birth to and reared five children, the five 
plaintiffs last named above. 
4. That since the beginning of said relation-
ship, said plaintiff and the said John A. Burt lived 
together as man and wife; that the said John A. 
Burt " ... as a man of strong character with definite 
opinions and ideas who treated plaintiff and the 
five children aforesaid with strictness and firm-
ness demanding obedience in all things ; that said 
John A. Burt was a man of unusual business 
ability, and obtained the respect and confidence 
of these plaintiffs in all matte-rs. pertaining to 
business and business transactions. 
5. That said plaintiff through most of her 
life has been afflicted with a nervous ailment, 
which at intervals has prostrated said plaintiff 
-and which since the time of her said marriage to 
the said John A. Burt, has at times ·caused her 
to be dependent upon the said John A. Burt for 
help and assistance in maintaining herself and 
her home, and until the said children became old 
enough to be of assistance to her, at the time of 
the onset of said nervous spells as aforesaid, she 
was entirely dependent upon said John A. Burt; 
that during some of the· more severe spells of sick-
ness aforesaid, plaintiff has been unconsciou.s 
and .otherwise unable to give consideration to 
business affairs or matters concerning herself or 
her property or to act rationally in the conduct 
of her affairs. 
6. That on or about the 12th day of March~ 
1941, said John A. Burt caused said plaintiff to 
sign a d0ed, in 'vhich ~he was the grantor and he 
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\vas the grantee of the property described in par-
agraph No. 1 hereof ; that said plaintiff had there-
fore refused to sign such a deed but did s9 upou 
this occasion :at the instance and request and 
under the direction of the said John A. Burt, 
who stated to said plaintiff that because of the 
serious illness from which .she was then suffering 
and because of the possibility that she would not 
re-cover from it would be better that she sign a 
deed conveying the property to him; that in re-
liance thereon· and under the direction and under 
the influence and domination of the said John A. 
Burt, said plaintiff did sign the deed aforesaid, 
but did not appear before a notary public for the 
purpos.e of having her signature thereon acknowl-
edged and did surrender the said deed to said 
John A. Burt. 
7. At the time of signing .said deed arnd de-
livering it to the said John A. Burt, said plaintiff 
did not receive any compensation or other consid-
eration for said deed, but delivered it to (signed 
the deed for) the said John A. Burt because 
of her reliance upon him and because of the great 
influence and domination which he exercised over 
her; that thereafter said plaintiff saw nothing 
more of said deed .and heard nothing more of it 
until during the n1onth of l\1ay, 1948, when the 
said deed was. found in the deposit box of the 
said John A. Burt following his sudden death, by 
defendant, Luella H. Burt, the administratrix of 
his estate. 
8. That the said Leulla H. Burt has taken 
possession o:f said deed and has refused to deliver 
it up to said plaintiff and has caused said deed 
to be recorded in the office of the County R.e-
corder. of Salt L·ake County, Utah; and has in-
formed said plaintiff that she intends to list sa1c1 
property as part of the assets of the estate of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
said J ohu A. Burt and to dPprivP said plaintiff 
of it as her ho1ne .and to diYide it up among the 
heirs at la""' including herself, of the said John 
A. Burt, deceased. 
9. That the five plaintiffs last named above 
are the children of plaintif;f Geneve Graehl Burt 
and John A. Burt, deceased, and are \Yilling and 
agreeable that the deed to said property be re-
turned to plaintiff, their mother; that the other 
defendants refuse to surrender the .said deed; 
that plaintiff is \Yithout a remedy except as 
prayed herein. 
SECOND CAUiS'E OF ACTION 
10. F'laintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, alleges 
as a second cause of action, that on the 30th day 
of August, 1920, she and John A. Burt, deceased, 
entered into what in good faith she thought was 
a valid and legal marriage, and since that time 
through their relationship entered into as afore-
said, she has given birth to and reared five chil-
dren, the five plaintif:fs last named above. 
11. That since that time and during the in-
tervening twenty-eight years until the death of 
the said John A. Burt on May 12, 1948, said 
plaintiff and the said John A. Burt, worked and 
planned tog·ether for the acquisition and devel-
opment of an estate; that the said John A Burt 
lived at the home of said plaintiff during a por-
tion of the intervening time; that said plaintiff 
cooked his meals, mended his clothes, and other-
wise provided for his wants and needs, and dis-
cussed with him values of certain properties and 
the advisability of .acquiring or selling of said 
properties; that said plaintiff on occasion went 
with said John A. Burt to view properties; that 
said plaintiff lent encouragement to .said John A. 
Burt on his plans and undertakings and assisted 
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him in various ways in the accumulation of sub-
stantial properties. 
12. That said John A. Burt died suddenly 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on M.ay 12, 1948, with-
out leaving any will and without making any pro-
vision for distripution of the property and estate 
accumulated as aforesaid by the said John A. 
Burt. 
13. That defendant, Luella H. Burt, has 
been appointed as. administratrix for the estate· 
of John A. Burt, deceas.ed, and has proceeded 
with the administr.ation of said estate indicating 
tha.t she will complete the administration of said 
estate and divide it among the heirs at law (in-
cluding herself) of the said John A. Burt, and 
will make no provision for said plaintiff. 
14. Said plaintiff estimates the value of 
the estate of said John A.- Burt to be about 
$60,000.00, and alleges that because of her con-
tribution to s.aid estate and the assistance she has 
rendered to the John A. Burt in the development 
and accumulation of said estate, and that because 
of her participation in the development of said 
estate, she has an interest in said estate amount-
ing to $20,000.00. 
15. That she has no re·medy or means of se-
curing for herself said interest except as prayed 
for herein. 
WHEREF01RE, plaintiffs. demand judgment 
under the first cause of action: 
1. That the deed delivered by said plain-
tiff to said John A. Burt be determined by the 
court to be void. 
2. Tha.t the defendants produce said deed 
and deliver it up to be cancelled. 
3. That de;fendants cause that the record of 
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said deed and conYeyance be rPmoved from the 
records at the County R-ec.order's office of Salt 
Lake County, aforesaid. 
Under the second cause of action : 
1. That the estate of said John A. Burt, 
deceased, be divided so as to provide for said 
plaintiff a share amounting to the sum of 
$20,000.00 or for such other share as in equity 
and good conscienc~ this said plaintiff m.ay be 
entitled to receive. 
And for any and all other relief meet in the 
premises and for the costs of this action.'' 
Defendants filed general demurrers (Tr. 7) to each 
of said causes of action; and their ,AiN~SWER to the 
complaint ( Tr. 8 to 12), except for the verification, is as 
follows: 
'' 1. Deny Paragraph 1 thereof. 
2. In answer to_ Paragraph 2 thereof, admit 
that the said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, came 
into possession of the property described in Par-
agraph 1 of said Complaint in and about August, 
1939, through the permission of John A. Burt, 
the deceas.ed. ·Admit that some improvements 
have been made upon the said property, but allege 
the fact to be that the said deceased, John A. 
Burt, himself made said improvements, either 
through the expenditure of his own funds or 
through the ,, ... ork and labor of his children. The 
defendants allege further that the plaintiff, Gen-
eve Graehl Burt, has paid no rental for the use 
of said property. 
3. In answer to Paragraph 3 thereof, these 
defendants deny that said Geneve Graehl Burt 
thought or had any grounds of believing that she 
was entering into a legal and valid marriage with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
the said John A. Burt. On the contrary, the said 
plaintiff, Geneve Gra.ehl Burt, knew at the time 
of the purported marriage, that the .said John 
A. Burt, deceased, already had a legal and lawful 
wife living .and a family by her. Admit that the 
said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, has given 
birth to five (.5) children by said John A. Burt, 
deceased. 
4. Deny, both generally and specifically, 
each and every allegation contained in Paragraph 
4, and .allege the fact to be that when said Geneve 
Graehl Burt and said John A. Burt, deceased, 
lived together that the said plaintiff, Geneve 
Graehl Burt, and the said John A. Burt, deceased, 
well knew that such relationship was contrary to 
the laws of the State of Utah and was, and is 
now, punishable by imprisonment in the State 
Penitentiary. 
5. In answer to F:aragraph 5 thereof, ad1nit 
the deceased, John A. Burt, has given the said 
Geneve Graehl Burt great assistance, financially 
and otherwise, but on information and belief, 
deny, both generally and specifically, each and 
every other allegation contained in Paragraph 5. 
6. In answer to Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 
thereof, the defendants. deny each and every alle-
gation contained therein, except that may be ad-
mitted or qualified herein. 
7. Defendants deny, both generally and .spe-
cifically, each and every other ·allegation con-
tained in first said cause of action. 
By way of .an -affirmative defense to the fi~st 
cause of action, the answering defendants allege 
that in 19~39 the deceased, John A. Burt, pur-
chased with his own money the real property spe-
cifically described in f:aragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, and caused the same to be placed of 
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record in the name of. GPnPYe Gra.ehl, who is 
named as one of the plaintiffs. herein as Geneve 
Braehl Burt. In 1941, realizing that upon the 
death of said Geneve Graehl Burt said property 
would go to her fiYe children, named as plaintiffs 
herein, and that his other five children by his 
legal and lawful \\'i.fe, Luella H. Burt, named as 
defendants herein, would get no part of said 
property, he requested said Geneve .Graehl 
to deed said property to him, the said property 
being equitablr O\Yned by him in any instance. 
In order that all of the heirs of the deceased, 
John A. Burt, might inherit said property, the 
said Geneve Graehl did of her own free 
_ will and choice oil March 12, 1941, duly execute 
·and deliver to said John A. Burt, deceased, said 
deed of conveyance. That ever since said time, 
said deed together \Yith the Abstract of Title to 
said property have been in the possession of said 
John A. Burt, and which were in his p~ossession 
at the time of his demise. The Utah State rrax 
Commission insists that said property be made 
part and parcel of his estate for taxation pur-
poses. 
That in order to protect the interests of all 
of the heirs-at-law of said John A. B·urt, de-
ceased, it became the duty of Luella I-I. Burt, 
the administratrix, to, and she did, file in the 
County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake· County, 
State of Utah, said deed. 
These defendants allege further that after 
the said Geneve Graehl executed and delivered 
to said John A. Burt, deceased, the said deed, 
the said John A. Burt made, at his own expense 
and with the work and labor of his ovvn children, 
considerable· im-provements and built a building 
on said lot. 
That the plaintiffs are barred from proceed-
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ing with this action on the grounds that they are 
guilty of laches. That if said John A. Burt, de-
ceased, used any undue influence or domination 
of Geneve Gra.ehl Burt to have her execute and 
deliver to him the said deed, the Geneve Graehl 
Burt should have commenced proceedings imme ... 
diately following the same, rather than to wait 
more than seven ye.ars following such execution 
and delivery, and until after the death of the said 
Grantee. 
The said plaintiffs .a:re barred from any ac-
tion in this. matter by reason of Section 104-2-24 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 19·43. 
That the said plaintiffs are barred from any 
legal action in this rna tter py reason of Section 
104-2-30 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
IN ANIS1WER TO' PLAINTIFFS' SECOND 
CAUS·E O·F ACTION, the defendants admit, 
deny and allege as follows : 
1. Deny Paragraph 10 thereof, except that 
said defendants admit that the said Geneve 
Graehl Burt has given birth to five ( 5) childrrn 
by said John A. Burt, deceased. 
2. Deny each and every allegation contained 
in Paragraph 11 thereof. 
3. In answer to Paragraph 12 thereof, the 
defendants admit that the said John A. Burt died 
on or about May 12, 1948, without leaving a will, 
and deny each and every other allegation con-
tained in Paragraph 12, but allege the fact to be 
that the said five ( 5) children of the. plaintiff, 
Geneve Graehl Burt, under the laws of the State 
of Utah will inherity one-third of the entire estate 
of said John A. Burt in their own right. Said 
estate, after paying all debts, will amount to up-
proximately $60,000.00. · 
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4. In answer to Fara.gr.a.ph 13 thereof, ad-
mit the same and allege the ·further fact to be 
that under the law, the p•laintiffs, excepting the 
plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, will receive one-
third of the entire estate of the said John A. 
Burt, deceased, as aforesaid. 
5. In ans,ver to Paragraph 14 thereof, the 
defendants admit that the value of said estate 
is about $60,000.00, but deny each and every other 
allegation contained in Paragraph 14. 
6. Deny, both generally and specifically, 
each and every other allegation contained in Sec-
ond Cause of Action. 
7. That the plaintiffs are barred from pro-
ceeding with this action on the grounds that they 
are guilty of laches That the plaintiffs are barred 
from any action in this matter by reason of the 
Statute of Limitations under Sections 104-2-23 
and 104-2-30 of the- Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
"\VHEREFORE, the answering -9efendants 
pray that_.the plaintiffs' Complaint he dismissed 
with costs assessed .against the plaintiffs, and for 
SUCh:-Other relief that the C·ourt may deem proper 
in the premises.'' - -
The Court held a -p!re~trial on December 3, 1948, and 
after the case was called .for trial on December 8, 1948, 
the Court handed to co~sel a written pap·er called PRE-
TRIAL ,STAT·EMENT the whole of which is as follows: 
''rrhe above-entitledmatter came on for pre-
trial hearing, pursuant to the order of the Court, 
at 3 :00 o'.clock P. l\I. on the 3r.d day of December, 
1948, before fionorable J. Allan Crockett, one 
of the judges uf the above-named court. lVIerrill 
C. Faux, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plain-
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tiffs, and Gaylen S. Young, Esq., appeared on be-
half of the defendants. 
John A. Burt, herein called the deceas·ed, and 
Geneve Graehl Burt, herein called plaintiff, went 
through a purported marriage ceremony about 
September 30, 1920, and thereafter cohabited to-
gether and lived more or less continuously to-
gether, at least until about 1934. Born to them 
were the five children who have joined their 
mother as co-plaintiffs in her interest in this 
action. 
During the time above mentioned, said John 
A. Burt had a leg.al wife and another family, con-
sisting of the above-named defendants with whom 
he also lived more or less continuously during 
the same period of time, and up until his death 
on May 12, 1948. 
During the time aforementioned, and until 
his death, .said deceased exerted efforts to pro-
vide for plaintiffs., and maintained his interest 
in them as his family. About August 15, 1939, 
there was selected the property described in Par-
agraph 1 of the complaint as a home for plaintiff 
and her children; they moved thereon, whe-re they 
have since resided. The deed to such property 
showed Geneve Graehl as grantee and was duly 
recorded. Plaintiff did not individually invest 
any of her separate money in said property. 
March 12, 1941, the deed, Exhibit A, naming 
de-ceased a.s grantee, \Vas signed by plaintiff (and 
surrendered to deceased). There was no actual 
payment of money, or transfer of other physical 
thing of value in connection with the signing of 
said deed. The deed was left in a safety deposit 
box, which deceased had exclusively in his name, 
where it was found at the time of his death. The 
abstract to s-aid property was in the posse·ssion of 
said deceased. 
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Said deed wa.s recorded at the request of 
Gaylen S. Young, attorney for the defendant ad-
ministratrix, on July 29, 1948:. 
Plaintiff, during aJl times material to this 
cause, has been suffering from a nervous ailment 
which, at times, has caused her to be confined to 
her bed. 
The estate of said deceased is being probated 
in this court and appraised by the County Ap-
praisers in the sum of approximately $89,000, 
which includes an item of $15,000 for the property 
in controversy hereinbefore referred to, and de-
scribed in Paragraph 1 of the complaint. 
If plaintiff is entitled to recover on her third 
cause of action, it is .agreed that $200 per year 
for each child is a reasonable charge for care 
and attention given by plaintiff to her children, 
the other plaintiffs. 
Disputed issues : 
1. Defendant contends that, although there 
was no formal separation between plaintiff and 
· deceased, they ceased cohabitation more than ten 
years ago. 
2. Did plaintiff contact and continue the 
marriage relationship in good faith, believing it 
to be a valid marriage~ 
3. Was there a valid delivery of the deed, 
Exhibit A~ 
4. Was there a valid consideration for the 
deed, Exhibit A? 
5. Was the delivery of Exhibit A for a spe-
cial purpose only and "\\7ithout the necessary in-
tent to vest title in the grantee~ 
There is some dispute about the acknowledge-
ment of Exhibit A, but the parties agree that the 
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failure, if there was such failure, to have it prop-
erly acknowledged would not in and of itself in-
validate the deed. 
J. ALLAN CRO·C'KETT 
Judge'' 
At some time the words in parenthesis ''and surren-
dered to deceased'' were crossed out of the file copy 
(Tr. 27 and 28). 
At the trial one Edwin E. Johnson testified that 
about 19141 he tried to buy a strip of the land in que·s--
tion from the deceased, John ,A. Burt, but that he would 
not sell it because ''he p~roposed to have a home there 
for his wife and children.'' ( Tr. 57 and 58). 
The deceased, John A. Burt, frequented the place 
two or three times a week ( Tr. 60). He had his legal 
and lawful wife and family living in another part of 
the city. John A. Burt hired men to work on the place 
(Tr. 69). He paid them. (Tr. 73). Geneve Graehl did 
not stand any of the expense. John A. Burt took charge 
of the place. ( Tr. 73). The deceased's brother did a lot 
of work on the house. (Tr. 75). John A. Burt "worked 
on the place, irrigated.'' ( Tr. 90). Geneve Graehl Burt 
got permission of the deceas.ed to build a garage-like 
house on the property ( Tr. 113). John A. Burt bought 
the place with his own money and had the title taken in 
the name of Geneve Graehl. Said plaintiff used that 
name as well as Davis and Geneve Graehl Burt. (Tr. 120 
and 123). 
When the supposed marriage took place the plain-
tiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, says she knew they had to 
have a license and a m.arTiage certificate which they did 
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not get. \Y.ht>n questioned as to \YhPther or not about 
1930 when the eivil authorities "'ere after the polyga-
mists she and the deceased ag-reed from then on not to 
live together as man and wife she said ''no. '' When 
asked a further question 'vhether or not the deceased 
and she would thereafter comply with the civil law she 
answered ''no, w·e did not; it never bothered us;'' and 
that they were "firm in their convictions," and con-
science is what guided them. She knew at the time of 
the supposed marriage that the deceased John A. Burt 
had a legal wife and family living and that his said 
legal wife, Luella H. Burt survived him. 
There was no understanding that plaintiff Geneve 
Graehl Burt should not part with title at the time of 
execution of the deed. Xo understanding that way at all. 
(Tr. 107). She has lived there since Mr. Burt purchased 
it and has not paid any rent. ( Tr. 123). 
~Ir. Burt brought up the question of her executing 
the deed several times. She refused at first but later she 
consented to sign it. She then signed the deed conveying 
the property to him. She surrendered and delivered the 
deed to John A. Burt, the deceased. (Tr. 3). 
After both parties had rested and over the objee-
tion of defendants the court on motion of the plaintiffs' 
attorney pP1·n1ith)d plaintiffs to amend the complaint by 
~triking out the words shown in italics in paragraph8 
6 and 7 .and by adding the four words shown in paren-
tlH)sis is paragraph 7. Also during the trial an amend-
n1ent was made adding. the water right clause following 
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the description of the real estate as found in finding 
No.3. 
Leaving out the titles and the preliminary state-
ments the :findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
decree are ( Tr. 29 to 34) as follows: 
"FINDINGS O·F FACT 
FIRST Q:AUIS'E 0 1F' kCTION: 
1. Geneve Graehl Burt, hereinafter called 
plaintiff, .and John A. Burt, hereinafter called the 
deceased, on or about s.eptember 30, 1920, went 
through .a proported marriage ceremony and 
thereafter cohabited together and lived more or 
less continuously together up until the death of 
the deceased on May 12, 19'48. Born to them dur-
ing that time were the five children 'vho have 
joined their mother as co-plaintiffs, in her inter-
est in this action .and during that time said de-
ceased exerted efforts to provide for plaintiffs 
and maintained his interest in them as his family. 
2. Also during the time above mentioned, 
said John A. Burt had a legal wife and another 
family consisting of the above named de\fendants 
with whom he also has lived more or less con-
tinuously during the same period of time and up 
until his death. That plaintiff, at the time of her 
purported marriage to deceased, knew of his 
other wife and family, but becaus.e of religious 
convictions believed her assoeia tion with deceased 
to be proper. 
3. . On about August 15, 1939, plaintiff and 
deceased selected as a home for plaintiff and her 
children the property known as No. 2150 Ever-
green Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, more 
particulartly described as follows: 
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Commencing 1223.7 feet East from North-
west Corner of Section 34, To:wnship 1 South 
R 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 315 
feet more or less to Salt Lake City Tract; 
thence South 99 feet; thence s.outh. 14 ° 26' 30" 
East 154.38 feet, thence West 44.3 feet South 
12·8.8 feet to creek; Westerly along the creek 
to a point due South of beginning North 332 
feet to beginning. 2.55 Acres. 
Together with all water and water rights 
appertaining to said lands, including 1500 gal-
lons per day from the Mill Creek ; also 3 I 4/5 
hours. of water every 7 days out of the Keller 
ditch. 
That plaintiffs soon thereafter moved upon 
said property where they have since resided. r~rhe 
deed to such property showed Ge_neve Graehl as 
grantee and was duly recorded. Plaintiff did not 
individually invest any of her separate money in 
said property. 
4. During the time plaintiff has lived on 
said property, she with her own hands and labor 
and by directing others, has improved said land 
by planting fruit trees and gardens thereon, hy 
removing stump·s, dilapidated buildings and by 
landscaping said ground and improving other 
buildings and by building new structures and per-
mitting the building of other structures thereon 
and has greatly enhanced and increased the value 
of said property. 
5. That during .all times material to this 
case, plaintiff has suffered from a nervous ail-
ment, which at times has rendered her unable 
to attend the affairs of her home and caused her 
to he confined to her bed. 
6. That on or about the 12th day of March, 
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1941, the deed admitted in evidence as ''Exhibit 
A'' in said case naming deceas.ed as grantee 
and containing the description of property as set 
out in paragraph 3 hereof was signed hy plaintiff. 
There was no actual pay!Jlent of money or trans-
£ er of other physical thing of value in connec-. 
tion with the· signing of said deed. The deed was 
left in a safety deposit box, which deceased had 
exclusively in his name, where it was found at 
the time of his death. The abstract of said prop-
erty was in possession of said deceased. Sai~ 
deed was recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder Olf Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at 
the request of Attorney Ga.ylen S. Young, at-
torney for defendant, administratrix, on July 
29, 1948:, in book No. 625, page 115 .. 
·7. That plaintiff did not intend to part with 
title to said property when she signed the deed 
aforesaid, but intended it to operate only in the 
event of and at the time of her death, and that 
she did not deliver said deed to deceased. That 
the estate of said deceased is being probated in 
this court, and has been appraised by the County 
appraisers in the sum of app·roximately $89,000.00 
which includes an item of $15,000.00 for the prop-
erty described in parara.ph 3 hereof. 
,SEC:OIND CAU~SE O·F ACTI01N: 
8. As to the second cause of action, the 
court finds in accordance with and incorporates 
herein the findings set forth in para.raphs 1, 2, 
3, and 4 hereof. 
9. That during the· p·eriod between the time 
that plainti££ .and deceased went through the pro-
ported marriage ceremony on September 20, 
1920, and the death of the deceas.ed on May 12, 
1948', said plain tiff and deceased worked · and 
planned together for the acquisition and develop-
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ment of nn estate; that said John A. Burt lived 
at the ho1ne of said plaintiff during a portion of 
said period. That plaintiff discussed with de-
ceased, values of certain real estate properties 
and the adYiseability of acquiring or selling said 
properties; that said plaintiff on occasions went 
with said deceased to view real estate properties, 
and that said plaintiff lent encouragement to said 
deceased on his plans and undertakings, and in 
doing all of the :foregoing assisted him in the ac-
cumulation of the substantial properties inven-
toried in the proceedings to prohate his estate 
now pending in this court. 
10. That when deceased died as aforesaid, 
he left no will and made no provision for distri-
bution of the property in the estate accumulated 
by him of the value of $89,000.00 as. appraised 
by the County appraisers aforesaid. 
11. As to the third cause of action, plain-
tiffs abandoned it during the course of said trial 
and the court according·ly with respect to said 
cause of action, makes no findings of fact. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIO·NS OF LAW 
That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment 
and decree as follo,vs: 
As to the FIRST CAU:S·E O·F. ACTIO,N: 
(a) That the deed referred to in paragraph 
3 of the Findings of Fact herein should be de-
termined to be void, and the same should be 
cancelled. 
(b) That the plaintiff should be allowed 
the property described in said paragraph 3 of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
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As to the SECOND CAUSE O·F ACTIO-N: 
(c) That in the event, through appeal or 
review of the judgment he-rein, the conclusions 
of the court as to the first cause of action should 
be held to be error, and that on that account the 
judgment based thereon he reversed, then and 
in tha.t event plaintiff should be entitled to an 
equitable distribution of the property of said de-
ceased, acquired during the time this plaintiff 
and deceased were cohabiting as man and wife 
and inventoried in the proceedings to probate his 
estate now pending in this court. 
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1949. 
J. ALLAN CRO~CKETT 
Judge" 
"JUDGMENT AND DECRE·E 
NO!W TI-IEREF·O·RE, IT IS HEREBY OR-
D·ERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the deed referred to and described 
in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact herein, 
and recorded on July 28, 19·48, in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County in 
Book No. 625, page 115, be and is hereby held to 
be void and is hereby cancelled. 
2. That plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt, is 
hereby allowed the property home and grounds 
known as No. 2150 Evergreen Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
(Same description as in finding No. 3). 
It is the fqrther judgment of this court that 
should plaintiff by appeal or review of this judg-
ment be deprived of the ownership of the prop-
erty described in the foregoing paragraph hereof, 
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then and in that PYent, said plaintiff should be 
granted and allowed ·an equitable interest in the 
estate of deceased, John A. Burt, the amount of 
such interest to be determinPd by further pro-
ceedings in this court. 
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1949. 
J. ALLAN CROCKETT 
Judge'' 
1. The Court erred in overruling defendants' gen-
eral demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause· of action. 
2. The Court erred in overruling defendants' gen-
eral demurrer to plaintiffs' second cause of action. 
3. The Court erred in rendering judgment for 
plaintiffs on the first cause as amended when the same 
does not state facts suf;ficient to constitute a cause of 
action . 
4. There is a variance between the pleadings and 
the proof in first cause of action. 
5. There is a variance between the pleadings and 
the proof in second cause of action. 
6. That the conclusion (b) of first cause of action 
is not supported by the findings or the pleadings. 
7. That the Court erred in trying to maintain jur-
isdiction of second cause of action, after rendering a 
decision thereon, until after first cause of action should 
be determined in the Supreme Court. 
8. The Court errPcl in making one of the issues in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
dispute at the beginning of the trial the valid delivery 
of the deed. ( Tr. 28:). 
9. The Court erred in making one of the issues in 
dispute at the beginning of the trial the delivery of the 
deed ,for a special purpose only and without the nec-
essary intent to veRt title in grantee. (Tr. 28). 
10. The· Court erred in permitting Geneve Graehl 
Burt over the objection of defendants to testify what 
was in her own mind as is shown in the following tes-
timony found on pp. 106 and 107 of transcript. 
''By Mr. Faux: 
Q. Mrs. Burt. I hand you what has been marked. 
here as Exhibit B, (the deed) and ask you. if that is your 
signature1 
A. Yes, think it is mine. 
Q. State whether or not when you signed that, you 
had the intention of parting with title to that property 
during your life time 1 
Mr. Young: Just a minute, I object to this on the 
ground it is attempting to vary the terms of a -vvritten 
instrument. 
Mr. Faux: I resist that; it goes to the very crux 
of. this la~w suit. 
The Court: Just missed a word right in the begin-
ning; ''In connection with the signing of that deed, did 
you intend''-' was the general question, did you ever 
intend-
Mr. Faux: No, I have forgotten. 
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The Court: "\Vny I understand it you asked it gen-
erally, -and to that question, I would sustain an objection. 
Let's get back-she said that is her signature; with 
reference to that signature, you asked her what? 
Q. (By nir. Faux) Whether or not you intended to 
part with the title of the property covered by that deed 1 
A. There was no understanding-
l\Ir. Young: Just a minute. 
The Court: She may ans\ver. 
Mr. Young: nlay we have an objection~ 
The Court : Yes. 
Mr. Young: We want to object in case-
The Court: That is- all right; you may have your 
objection; she may answer. 
Q. State \Yhether or not you intended, during your 
lifetime, to part with the title to that property. 
A. Absolutely no; there wasn't any understanding 
that way at -all." 
11. The Court erred when it failed to follow its rul-
ing in the following instance: 
Mr. Faux asked the said Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt 
( Tr. 81) : Did you finally consent to sign a deed to take 
care of things in case of your death~ 
A. ----- ''so he told me that it would be wise for 
me to sign the deed, in case I should die'' etc. 
Mr. Young objected and further on -at the bottom 
of p. 125 moved that state-ments he made to her be 
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stricken on the grounds it was all hearsay and contrary 
to the dead ma.n''s statute. 
The Court after some discussion said it ''will dis-
regard the evidence that is incompetent insofar as I 
am able to; is that satisfactory, Mr. Young." 
Mr. Young: That's all right. 
Finding No. 7 indicates the Court disregarded its 
promise in this respect. 
12. The Court erred in failing to make findings, 
conclusions and judgment as to whether or not the plain-
tiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the statute of 
limitations as presented in the issues by the last three 
unnumbered paragraphs of defendants' affirmative de-
fense to the .first cause of action. 
13. That the Court erred in failing to make find-
ings, conclusions and judgment as to whether or not 
the plaintiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the 
statute of limitations a.s presented in the issues in par-
agraph 7 of defendants' . ans.wer to plaintiffs' second 
cause of action. 
14. That the conclusions of law and judgment con-
cerning the first cause of action are contrary to law, 
15. That the conclusions of law and judgment con-
cerning the second cause of action are contrary to law. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN OVE·RRULING DE-
FENDANTS' DEMURRER- TO· THE FIRST CAUSE 
O·F ACTIOIN: 
This cause alleged at the time of demurrer: 
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(a) The ownership by Geneve Graehl Burt of 
the property in question. 
(b) In 1920 she entered into what she thought 
was a Yalid and legal marriage with deceased, John 
~\. Burt. 
(c) That said Burt 'Yas a man of strong char-
acter and demanded obedience in all things. 
(d) That he had unusual business ability and 
obtained plaintiffs' respect and confidence in busi-
ness rna tters. 
(e) That plaintiff was afflicted with a ner~ 
vous ailment. 
(f) That said plaintiff had refused to sign the 
deed as requested by John A. Burt before but on 
March 12, 1941, at his instance and reque·st and 
under his direction she signed the deed and sur-
rendered it to him. At the time he stated to her 
"that because of the serious illness from which she 
was suffering and because of the. possibility that 
she would not recover it would be better that she 
sign a deed conveying the property him. '' 
(g) That in reliance thereon under his influ-
ence and domination she did sign and surrender the 
deed to said John A. Burt. 
The complaint sounds in .fraud but it does not con-
tain the necessary alle·gation to support a fraud action. 
It is enough to say that in no place does it contain any 
alleg~ation that Mr. Burt made any representations to 
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the grantor that were false·, nor that she believed such 
represen ta.tions. 
The complaint would also seem to indicate that a 
cause of action might have been intended in the nature 
of unduH influence. In that instance there would certain-
ly have to be pleaded facts to show incapacity or weak-
ness of mind of the grantor. A person might be ever 
so weak physically but a giant mentally. ''Influence ob-
tained by persuasion and argument, or gainoo by kind-
ness and affeetion, is. not pfrohibited, where no imposi-
tion of fraud is practiced, and where the person ~s will 
is not overcome . . . . . . ''Undue influence is a species 
of fraud" p. 1778 Black's L:aw Dictionary Third Edition 
undeT ''Undue influence.',. 
The fact that ~ ohn A. Burt was a strong character 
is not suf:ficient. The grantor could be a woman with 
much stronger will than the grantee. It appears. from 
the complaint that she deeded that property back to 
him because she wanted him to have it. She wanted to 
be fair about it. The property she knew belonged to Mr. 
Burt. He paid for it. She did not feel that the property 
in case of her death should all go to her children when 
Mr.· Burt1 also had five children of Luella H. Burt, his 
legal and lawful wife. It was not agreed that Mr. Burt 
should have control of the property only in case of the 
grantor's death. He thought it was better and wise that 
the propeTty be in his name. She thought with him that 
it would be better also. She continued in that thinking 
for seven years .. It was not until after she found out that 
he died that she changed her mind. She is not willing 
now that the children of the legal wife share in the 
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property. She in effect tells this court that she made a 
n1istake and that it was not better; that she did not act 
wisely when .she deeded and conve·yed the property to 
him. That does not make a legal or equitable cause of 
action. 
The defendants do not belieYe the first rau.se states 
facts ·sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Court 
should have sustained the ~·eneral demurrer. 
~ 
2. THE CO,URT ERRED IN O·VE·R-RULING DE-
FEND,ANTS' D·EMURR.ER. TO· THE S E C 0 N D 
CAUSE O·F AC'TIO~N. 
We obtain from this cause: 
(a) That said John A. Burt, the deceased, left 
no provision for Geneve Graehl Burt by will and 
that she will not get any part of his estate when she 
thought she was legally married to him. 
(b) That she lived with him years and bore 
five children by him; that she cooked his meals, 
mended his clothes, etc.; that she discussed with him 
his business affairs and lent him encouragement 
and assisted him in various ways in accumulation 
of snbs.tan tial properties. 
Where is the cause of ae;tion in this case~ Suppose 
she did cook s.ome of his meals. She does not say that 
she was or was not well p·aid for those meals. She al-
leges no investment of time or money in his proper-
ties. Nor does she state that he ever took her in as a 
partner. Many people assist others in various ways to 
accumulate properties. A bank gives advice and encour-
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agement to its customers which may assist those cus-
tomers very materially in accumulating properties. That 
does not make the bank a joint owner or give them any 
interest in the properties. If she had no interest at 
the time of his death she has no interest now. 
At the time of his deHth the title of all his real 
and personal property vested in his heirs subject to 
administration of the estate-D. C. A. 101-4-2. Section 
101-4-5 U. c .. A. provides that the property must be dis-
tributed in the following manner: - - - - if the deceased 
leaves a surviving wife, and more than one child - - -
... - - one third to the surviving - - - - wife and the re-
mainder in equal shares to his children. Section 104-4-10 
provides that_ illegitimate children inherit · - - - - the 
same as if born in lawful wedlock. 
The prayer for the second cause asks that the 
estate of John A. Burt provide a share of $20,000.00 
for her-about one third oif the estate. The complaint 
does not set out any inter~st she had in the property 
at the time of his death. The Court has no jurisdiction 
to take away property belonging to and vested in the 
legal heirs. and give it to one who is not a legal heir-
and this too merely because plaintiffs 'think that de-
ceased should have made a will. 
We be~lieve that the second ea use· does not state 
facts, sufficient to constitute ·a cause of action and that 
the court should have sustained the general demurrer. 
As an argument in support of error number 3 de-
fendants adopt the argument in support of error num-
ber. 1. It can be noted that after the amendments to 
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the first cause of action ''rere made none of the facts 
as alleged were changed or modified. The amendments 
were clearly made to try to avoid the admission of de-
livery of the deed to the deceased, John A. Burt, but 
upon even a casual perus.al one can see there is still 
a de[inite admission that the deed was surrendered to 
said deceased in the last ten words of paragraph 6. 
(Tr. 3). 
Error ~~ zunber 4: 
THER.E IS~ A vTARIANCE BET·WEEN THE 
PLEADINGS AND THE PROOF IN FIB;ST UAUSE 
O·F ACTIO(N-. 
A variance is app,arent between the pleadings and 
the proof. The complaint and answer raises the issues a.s 
to whether or not the deceased, John A. Burt, by gain-
ing the confidence of the said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl 
Burt, using hi-s so called ''strong character'' forced her 
to sign and surrender to him the deed and whether or 
not she executed it only because of his great influence 
and domination over her. Not a scintilla of evidence was 
introduced to show that he used force or his strong 
character and domination over her to get her to sign 
the deed. On the other hand said plaintiff stated, as is 
reflected in finding number 7, that she signed the deed 
and intended ''it to- operate only in the event of and at 
the time of her death.'' No finding was made and no 
proof was given that the deed 'vas not executed of her 
own free will and choice. 
Error Number 5: 
THER.E IS A VARIANCE BETWEEN THE 
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PLEADING AND PR.OOF IN TI-IE SE~CO·ND CAUSE 
OIF . ACTI01N. 
The center point, or the foundation, upon which 
the whole· second cause of action was, built was the 
claim, a.s set out in par.a.graph 10 of the complaint, 
that said Geneve Graehl Burt "entered into what in 
good faith she thought was a valid and legal marriage." 
ThH proof shows quite to the contrary that she knew 
the marriage was invalid and illegal. (Tr. 121 and 122). 
Error Number 6: 
THAT C,O,NCLUSIO:N (b) ALLOWING PLAIN-
TIFF THE PROPERTY IN FIRST c·AUSE O~F AC-
TION IS NO'T SUFPO,RTED BY THE FINDINGS 
OIR PLEADINGS. 
There is no finding and no pleading in the first 
cause to the effect plaintiffs, or any of them, should 
be allowed the property in question. The action was 
one to void ~nd cancel a deed. 
Error Number 7: 
THE COURT ERRED IN TRYING TO· MAIN-
TAtN J·URISDICTIO'N OF SE,CO,ND CAUSE O~:B, 
AO'TION. 
By the las.t paragraph of the decree it looks like 
the trial court believed it was maintaining jurisdiction 
of the s·.econd cause. of action. On. the other hand it 
would appear that the trial court would desire to have 
the last say in this law suit ; for the decree provided 
that if the plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt should be de-
prived of the property in question then and . in that 
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event the said trial court would grant her an intpr·est 
in the estate of John A. Burt, deceased. Neither the 
findings, conclusion nor the facts justify such a de-
cree. It was ·a strong indirect persuasion put before 
defendants that they should not a.p,peal this case. This 
action of the court is a novel exp,erience to counsel in 
the realm of appeals. The trial of this case was fin-
ished and complete when plaintiffs and defendants 
rested. All the facts were in. S~ection 104-2·6-2 of the 
Utah Code Ann. 1943 provides. that upon the trial the 
"decision" of the Court "must he give·n in writing, 
and filed with the clerk within thirty days after the 
cause is submitted for decision.'' The decision in this 
sense means a final determination so far as the trial 
court is concerned. The defendants. take the position 
that th~ trial court bas no further jurisdiction in this 
matter once it is appealed. It has no power to call for 
further proceedings unless the Sup~reme Court directs. 
Errors Number 8 and 9: 
THE CO~URT ERRED IN MAKING VALID DE-
LIVERY O~F D·EED ONE OF ISS,UES AS WELL 
AS INTEXT TO, VE,S.T TITLE. 
The pre-trial was held five days before the case 
was tried. Counsel for defendants at no time admitted 
or conceded that one of the iss.ues in the case was the 
valid delivery of the deed. The pre-trial statement in 
at least one place and the comp~laint before the end of 
the trial in at least three places admitted that after the 
deed was signed it was surrendered or delivered to 
John A. Burt,. the deceased, and in another place that 
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Geneve Graehl Burt signed the deed conveying the prop-
erty to said Burt. Even at the end of the trial after 
th.e amendments to the complaint were made he plain-
tiffs admit in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of the 
complaint that she did sign the deed and surrendered 
it to him. So we think the court erred in making one 
of the issue the valid delivery of the deed. 
c·ounsel had no time to study the pre-trial state-
ment .. At the- pre-trial we did generally agree as to a 
very brief statement of facts taken from the pleadings. 
We saw nothing in writing until the time the case was 
called for trial. The so ealled ''disputed'' issues were 
arbitrarily made by the cou.rt. Neither counsel had a 
chance to <;heck it. The statements of facts is a very 
brief statement of what is contained in the pleadings. 
The disputed issue Number· 5 ''was the delivery of 
Exhibit A for a special purpose only and without the 
necessary· intent to vest title in grantee was a new 
phase injected into the case. The complaint states the 
grantee signed and surrendered the deed because of 
grantee's persuasion and undue influence. Nothing is 
found in the pleadings that grantor did not intend to 
give him the title. 
Error Number 10: 
THE C01URT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTI-
MONY VARYING THE TERMS O,F' A WRITTEN 
INSTRUMENT. 
The questions and answers as copied in statement 
of errors tells the story. The court refused to recog-
nize defendants' objection to plaintiffs' question on 
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direct examination of l\Irs. Geneve. Graehl Burt. Coun .. 
sel asked her if it was her intention to part with title. 
The objection was made on the ground that it was at-
tempting to Yary the tPrms of a \Yritten instrument. The 
deed showed on its face what it \Yas. It was a deed 
conY eying to grantee all of her interest. Now she wants 
to tell the court she did not intend to part with all the 
title but wanted it to operate only in case of her death. 
In other words she wanted to reserve in herself a life 
interest. The court permitting her to answer that ques-
tion over the objection of defendants was in violation 
of the well established rule that oral evidence will not 
be permitted to vary the terms of a written instru-
ment. This we think is reversable error. 
Error Number 11: 
THE CO~URT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOL-
J_jO·W IT:S O·WN RULING: 
Objection was made to statements that were sup:-
posed to have been made by deceased, John A. Burt, 
to plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt. After the statement 
was in counsel for defendants moved it be stricken. 
The court agreed to p~ay no attention to it. The find-
ings indicate that he did p~ay some attention to that 
testimony. 
Er-rors Number 12 and 13: 
THE CO~URT ER.RED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
FINDINGS O~N ALL THE MATERIAL ISSUES. 
I shall discuss errors 12 and 13 together. Both o:f 
them are on the ground that the court did not make any 
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findings, conclusions and judgment on the question of 
laches and statute of limitations as presented in the 
pleadings. This court has long held that no judginent 
can properly be rendered until there is a finding on 
all material issues. Thomas v. Farrell (Utah 1933) 
26 P. 2d 328, 82 Utah .5·37. The question of limitation 
and laches is very mate-rial in this case. The plaintiff 
Geneve Graehl Burt executed and delivered the deed 
to the deceased way back in 1941-more than seven 
years before. the grantee died. If he coerced her, or 
used his influence and domination on her to get her to 
sign the instrument she knew it then. She did not have 
to wait over seven years to find that out. If she had 
any rights arising from that transaction she certainly 
slept on them. If plain tiffs claim on the ground of 
fraud the action was barred under s.ection 104-2-24 
in three years. If they claim in equity then they are 
barred within a reasonable time-and seven years is 
far beyond a reasonable time in such a case. If they 
claim under any other ground they are barred under 
Section 104-2-30 in four years. Counsel may say, that 
may apply to the first cause of action but what about 
the second cause of action~ The grantor knew at all 
times that the deceased had a legal wife and family 
living and that his legal wife had her dower interest in 
whatever real estate he acquired. Now if grantor any 
time thought by her efforts she was entitled to 1/3, 
or any other amount, of his property why did she wait 
until after he was dead \vhen his mouth is closed to 
make that claim~ We do not say that the second cause 
of action gives. her any legal right of action-but if 
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she had any legal right by any supposed claim of 
partnership or joint ownership she cannot now after 
grantee's death assert it 'vithout proof of some kind 
of agreement bet"·een them. If there ever were any 
such agreement in justice and equity she should have 
asserted it while he 'vas alive. 
Error f.lu.mber 14: 
THE CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW AND JUDG-
~IEl\!Tf 0 1F FIR•ST CAUS.E OF· ACTION ARE CO·N-
TRARY TO LAW. 
They endeavor to void the deed and at the same 
time allow plaintiff the property. I fail to s.ee ho'Y they 
can do both. The plaintiff does not ask in the first 
cause for any allowance of prop·erty. Such a conclusion 
and decree are surplusage. It is also noted that con-
clusion (a) is based upon the finding that said plain-
tiff "did not intend to part with title'' and did not 
deliver said deed to deceased.'' This is absolutely con-
trary to the .admitted facts in the comp~aint, in the 
amended complaint and all of the surrounding circum-
stances of the case. 
We have already called the court's attention to 
the many p~a.ces in the original complaint where four 
distinct admissions of delivery of the deed were made. 
Even in the complaint as amended we have the follow-
ing words of admission of delivery, taken from the 
end of paragraph 6 : 
- - - - ''John A. Burt stated to said plain-
tiff that because of the serious illness from whieh 
she was then suffering and because of the pos-
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sibility that she would not recover it would be 
better that she sign a deed ; that in reliance 
thereon and under the direction and under the 
influence and domination of said John A. Burt, 
said plaintiff did sign the ·deed aforesaid - - -
- - - and did swrrender the said · deed to said 
John A. Burt.'' 
That statement is susceptible of. only one meaning is 
it not~ That is the deed was executed by her and de-
livered to him. If there were any question then it must 
be construed most .strongly against the pleader-vol. 
1 p. 635 Bancroft Code Pleading. In view of this ad-
mission and in view of the fact Mr.Burt had possession 
of the deed and abstract at the time of his death the 
defendants surely were under no burden to add further 
testimony of delivery. 
At no place in the complaint did plaintiffs allege 
that said Geneve Gra.ehl Burt did not intend to part 
with. title. There might he a weak inference, if the com-
plaint were construed most strongly in plaintiffs' favor, 
that she had confidence: and faith in him that he '\vould 
let her live there as long as she lived. Is not this the 
strongest inference in her favor you can draw from 
that pleading~ If the deceased had made her any 
promises to let her live there during her lifetime then 
her action should be one to reform. the deed and not 
to void an otherwise good deed. The action is not found-
ed upon her lack of intention to part with title. In any 
event we have her statement alone-and this was in 
answer to a leading question whether or not she intended 
to part with ti tie. The pleadings and the surrounding 
circumstances belie her elaim in this respect. 
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\Y. e think that in the beginning the property 'vas 
held in trust by plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt. She wa.s 
merely getting the beneficial u·se out of it with the 
consent of the deceased. It is not disputed that the de·· 
ceased purchased the property with his. own money. 
It is not disputed that he, the deceased, furnished her 
a place to live and for the most part supported her 
all these years from about 1920. We must bear in 
mind she was not his wife. So far as the law was con-
cerned she was a stranger to him. When he bought 
the property and caused it to be put in her name she 
held it in trust for him and was entitled to request 
her to deed it back to him at any time he wanted to. 
In the case of Anderson v. Cercone (Ut. 1919) 180 
P. 586, 54 Utah 345, the p·laintifrf and defendant had 
been married and later divorced. Plaintiff during their 
married life bought some real property and (as he 
said "I considered she had some interest in it because 
she was looking after the house and the children and 
helping me what she could do") he caused it to be 
put in her name (the defendant's). She later got a 
divorce. Plaintiff sued to quiet the title. The court held 
there was a resulting trust and that she held the prop-
erty in trust for him since he p1aid for it. 
The court quoted 39 Cyc. pp·. 118, 119 as follows: 
''It is a well settled rule of equity, in the 
absence of statutory provisions. otherwise, that 
where property is paid for with money or assetA 
of one person, and the title thereto is taken in 
the name of another person, in the absence of 
circumstances showing a different intention or 
understanding a resulting trust in the property 
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ar1ses in favor of the person whose money or 
assets are so used, or persons claiming under 
him, the controlling question being the owner-
ship of the purchase money, and this is true, 
although there is no actual intention on the part 
of the party purchasing and taking the convey-
ance to hold the equitable title for the partv 
whose funds are used in the p:urchas.e. '' . ., 
This rule is practically universal the court said 
except where changed by statute. Also s·ee Wheel .. 
wright vs. Roman (Utah 19'17) 165 P. 2d 513, 50 Utah 
10, and Estey et al v. Haughian (Mont. 1941) 113 P. 
325. 
John A Burt exercised control and ownership over 
the property. He frequented the place and worked on 
it. He hired people .to work on it. He paid them. He 
took charge of the place, hired his brother to do a lot 
of the work. He irrigated it. When some person wanted 
to buy a piece of the land he refused to sell. He did not 
refer him to said plaintiff. He never did anything which 
would lead one to believe that he did not claim owner-
ship. Mrs. (teneve Graehl Burt said she stood none of 
the expense. From this it could be reasonably inferred 
that she did not pay the taxes but that ·the deceased 
did. 
In view of the circumstances of this case I am sure 
the court would not say there was an inadequate con-
sideration. Since no conclusion of la:w was made as to 
whether or not there was adequate consideration this 
is probably not before t.he court. Suf1fice to say, how-
ever, in the case of Estey et al v. Haughian (Mont.) 
113 F'. 2d 325 above quoted the court held there was 
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sufficient consideration where the grantee had furnished 
part of the money for the purchase of the property 
the title to "'"hich was put in the name of the grantor. 
In that case the defendant and plajntiff had been living 
together for years as if they were married, but in fact 
were not married. Plaintiff Harriet Estey died and 
her heirs brought suit against defendant to set aside 
the deed given him by deceased. They declare the deed 
was void for reason deceased was insane at time of 
execution and on the further ground of undue influenee 
on part of defendant, that it was withou.t consideration 
and that deed was never delivered to defendant during 
her lifetime. 
The deed was not recorded until after the death 
of grantor, seven years after it was executed. The 
deed wa~ left in place where Mrs. E.stey, the deceased, 
had access to it and where Hau:ghian .said she could 
have it anytime she wanted it. 
There was not ·sufficient evidence to prove grantor 
was insane nor that there was undue influence. 
As to consideration-defendant furnished $600.00 
of the $1200.00 do-wn payment for the property. Then 
he turned over his checks to grantor over a period of 
years and from them monthly p~ayments were made on 
the property in question. - - - - ''To say that the deed 
was executed without consideration finds no support 
in the record'' the court said. 
The court held also there was sufficient delivery. 
In 18 C. J. p. 162, Sec. 42 we find that the grantor 
cannot deny. the -consideration stated. Further that in 
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the absence of fraud as between the parties or their 
heirs a deed is good without consideration. The de-
fendants submit that the deed on its face is an absolute 
conveyance of the fee and that there is not sufficient 
evidence supported by any proper conclusions of law 
to justify the judgment of the court in the first cause 
of action. 
As to Error Number 15: 
THE CO~NCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT OF THE SECOND C'AUSE OF· ACTION ARE 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
We have already said something about this in 
other parts of this brief. We shall merely add this: 
In the second cause the ·said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl 
Burt, is trying to get part of the _inheritance which 
rightfully, under the law, belongs to all the children 
of the deceased and his legal wife, Luella H. Burt, one 
of the defendants. It has long been the rule of law in 
this state, as we understand, that ''a plural wife is 
without the pale of the law of inheritance as to any 
property which her husband had acquired (before mar-
riage) or might thereafter acquire:" Raleigh v. Wells 
(Utah 1905) 81 P. 908, 29 Utah 217. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
trial court on both causes of action should be reversed; 
that both causes of action should be dismissed; that 
defendants are entitled to their costs. herein and for 
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such other relief ns to the court may seem proper In 
the premises. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
GAYLEN S. YO,UNG, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and A pp~ellants 
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